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Garver, Liquidations Under Section 337
Even if the claim and the refund can be made in time, from the
corporate viewpoint, it may be desirable, for other reasons, to prolong
the liquidation period and forego the benefit of section 337. This is
particularly true if the corporation suffers a net operating loss during
the year of liquidation, and earlier years were loss years. If it is expected
that the company will make money the next year or two, the corporation
may be better off by prolonging the liquidation, so as to avoid forfeiting
the benefit of this carryover. However, there is some limit to the time a
liquidation may be postponed.'
As an alternative, where a corporation has a net operating loss which
can not be carried back because of previous loss years, and the corporation
either does not wish to or is unable to sell its assets and liquidate within
a year so as to fall within section 337, it is possible for the company to
sell its assets and invest the return consideration in income-bearing se-
curities. The corporation thus becomes a personal holding company and
under section 545 (b) (4) it is permissible to carry the net operating loss
forward for one year.
In addition to the net operating loss, the corporation may realize a
loss on the sale of its assets. If the corporation remains subject to section
337, this loss will not be recognized. Of course, if the liquidation extends
more than one year, the loss will be fully recognized to the corporation.
In addition, involuntary conversions and sales of depreciable property
may, under section 1231 give rise to losses which can only be carried
forward.18 It may, therefore, be desirable to prolong the liquidation so
that the loss can be offset against gains realized in later years.
III
LIQUIDATIONS UNDER SECTION 337
Theodore M. Garver
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 included a new provision, section
337, which allows the tax-free sale of property by a corporation in the
process of liquidation. Prior to the adoption of the 1954 Code, the law
was marked by the confusion and unfairness inherent in the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Court Holding Company' and
United States v. Cumberland Public Service Company,' where in similar
17. See Weir v. Longleaf Lumber Co., 173 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1949). See also Rev. Rul.
61-191, 1961-1 Cu. BULL. 14.
18. CODE §§ 1231(a), 1231(b) (1), 1212.
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factual circumstances the Court held in one case that a liquidation had
been completed prior to the sale of corporate assets, resulting in no tax
to the corporation on the sale, and in the other, that the liquidation had
not been completed prior to the sale, resulting in a corporate tax on the
sale of assets. The legislative solution was to eliminate the recognition
of gain or loss on corporate sales of assets in the course of liquidation un-
der certain circumstances. Since the adoption of this provision, liquida-
tions under it have probably become the most common form of liquida-
tion when the liquidating corporation is not a controlled subsidiary' of
another corporation.
The statutory scheme is quite simple.4 In essence it provides that if
a corporation both adopts a plan of complete liquidation and within the
twelve-month period beginning on the date of the adoption of the plan
distributes all of its assets (other than assets retained to meet claims) in
complete liquidation, then no gain or loss is recognized to the corporation
on the sale or exchange of property by it within the twelve-month period.
While the statute further provides for somewhat complicated definitions
and exceptions, this simple language contains both most of the benefits
and most of the dangers in connection with these liquidations.
TIME WHEN PLAN OF LIQUIDATION IS ADOPTED
The experience of most practitioners seems to have been that the time
of adoption of the plan of liquidation is critical. In spite of all efforts to
liquidate completely well in advance of the end of the twelve-month
period, human nature being what it is, there always seem to be many de-
tails left to the last minute. In addition, of course, only gain or loss from
sales after the adoption of the plan are subject to non-recognition. The
best practice is to prepare a written plan and have shareholders take for-
mal action to adopt it. While recent cases5 indicate that this gives no
assurance that the plan has not been informally adopted prior to the
shareholder action, nevertheless, the formal action should be effective to
1. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
2. 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
3. In essence a controlled (eighty per cent) corporation is denied the benefits of section 337.
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337 (c) (2) [hereinafter cited as CODE f].
4. CODE § 337(a) provides:
"(a) GENERAL RULE. - If - (1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation
on or after June 22, 1954, and (2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of the
adoption of such plan, all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquida-
tion, less assets retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such cor-
poration from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period."
5. See Shull v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 447 (4th Cit. 1961); Whitson v. Rockwood, 190
F. Supp. 478 (D.N.J. 1960); Powell's Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc. v. Gross, 60-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 75,
817 (D.N.J. 1960); Mountain Water Co. of LaCrescenta, 35 T.C. No. 50 (Dec. 13, 1960);
1n re Turnpike Theatre Corp. (Super. Ct., Hartford County Conn. 1961), reported in Tax
Barometer, Aug. 19, 1961, 5 1302.
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establish that a plan has been adopted prior to the sale of assets upon
which non-recognition of gain or loss is desired.
The regulations6 recognize that formal action by shareholders adopt-
ing a plan of liquidation will not in all cases be decisive.' Nevertheless
they properly give considerable weight to formal action. They provide,
in effect, that if the corporation sells substantially all of its property for
which non-recognition is available prior to any formal shareholder action,
or if no substantial part of the property has been sold prior to such formal
action, then the formal action will be controlling as to the time of adop-
tion of the plan. In other cases the regulations leave us "to all the facts
and circumstances" to determine whether and when a plan of liquidation
has been adopted.
The regulations quite naturally speak only in terms of shareholder
action on a plan of liquidation. In actual practice shareholder action may
not be required on the liquidation but may be required either to author-
ize the sale of assets or to dissolve the corporation. The effect of share-
holder action on dissolution as opposed to liquidation has been clarified
in two recent cases. In Shull v. Commissioner' the taxpayer contended
that a plan of liquidation had been adopted at least by the time the stock-
holders' approval of dissolution had been certified by the secretary of
state. The Sixth Circuit agreed primarily on the theory that after that
time the corporate officers were required by state law to proceed to liqui-
date the corporation. On the other hand, in Mountain Water Company
of LaCrescenta,9 where virtually all the corporate assets had been sold
prior to the shareholder action necessary for dissolution, the Tax Court
viewed the dissolution as being a step in the liquidation process. There-
fore the shareholder action on dissolution was no indication that a plan
of liquidation had not been adopted at an earlier date. If these two cases
are followed generally, they will result in a rule that shareholder action
on dissolution establishes only the latest time for the adoption of a plan
of liquidation.
There has been a rash of decisions in the last year or so deciding
whether a plan of liquidation had been informally adopted at a time dif-
ferent from formal shareholder action or in spite of the lack of formal
shareholder action."0 While it is impossible to state a general rule as to
when a plan of liquidation will be considered to have been adopted from
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (1955) [hereinafter cited as Reg. 5].
7. It is possible to interpret Regulation section 1.337-6(a) (1) (1955), dealing with return
and reporting requirements, as requiring formal shareholder action in all cases. However, it is
clearly the law that such formality is not required for the adoption of a plan of liquidation.
See Burnside Veneer Co. v. Commissioner, 167 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1947).
S. 271 F.2d 447 (4th Cir. 1961).
9. 35 T.C. No. 50 (Dec. 13, 1960).
10. See note 5 supra.
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these cases, it is evident that they create a large element of uncertainty as
to the time when a plan of liquidation is adopted, particularly for the
small, closely-held corporation. It is likely that under the recent cases a
closely-held corporation will be considered to have adopted a plan of
liquidation at the time when the shareholders agree that liquidation is the
best course. In a two or three stockholder corporation this time will be
extremely hard to determine and if there is only one stockholder, it may
be close to impossible. While there is no way to be certain of the appli-
cation of section 337 in the liquidation of such a closely-held corporation,
the best insurance is to liquidate completely substantially prior to twelve
months from the date of the formal action of the shareholders.
When a corporation has a sufficient number of shareholders so that
shareholder action is not a foregone conclusion, considerable reliance can
be placed on the formal action of the shareholders. It has been correctly
held that the decision of corporate officers that the corporation should
liquidate if a sale is consummated does not constitute the adoption of a
plan both because it is contingent and because a mere decision by the
officers is not corporate action in this situation." It has also been held
that the fact that management regularly received sufficient proxies to
take full corporate action did not give management any special power to
adopt a plan of liquidation for federal tax purposes without an actual
shareholder's meeting.'2 On the other hand, there may be unusual cir-
cumstances which will constitute the adoption of a plan even for corpora-
tions which have a substantial number of shareholders. 3
The greatest controversy on the date of adoption of the plan of liqui-
dation is likely to come from corporations attempting to take undue ad-
vantage of section 337. If the date of adoption of the plan of liquidation
can be controlled by the date of formal shareholder action, many corpora-
tions will attempt to sell assets which are expected to result in a loss prior
to shareholder action and wait until after formal shareholder action be-
fore selling assets which are expected to result in gain. If this tactic is
successful, and it has been in one case,' 4 the corporation will have the full
tax benefit of all its losses without having to account for its gains. Ob-
viously this is not the situation the statute intended to create, and taxpay-
ers attempting this maneuver must expect close scrutiny by the Internal
11. Whitson v. Rockford, 190 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.J. 1960).
12. Virginia Ice & Freezing Corp., 30 T.C. 1251 (1958).
13. For example, in In re Turnpike Theatre Corp. (Super. Ct., Hartford County Conn. 1961).
reported in Tax Barometer Aug. 19, 1961, 5 1302, the appointment of a liquidating receiver
was held to constitute the adoption of a plan. In Mountain Water Co. of LaCrescenta, 35
T.C. No. 50 (Dec. 13, 1960), the decision of the board of directors to accept a condemnation
award where liquidation was inevitable upon the condemnation, was held to constitute the
adoption of a plan.
14. Virginia Ice & Freezing Corp., 30 T.C. 1251 (1958). See also Rev. Rul. 57-140, 1957-1
Cum. Bull. 118.
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Revenue Service. In such a case it would seem reasonable for a court to
hold that a plan had been adopted prior to the sale of the loss assets if the
tactics had been discussed with and approved by any substantial percent-
age of shareholders. Another deterrent to such a scheme is the possibility
of directors' liability under state law15 for commencing a plan to sell sub-
stantially all the assets of the corporation without stockholder approval,
particularly since the assets to be sold before stockholder approval would
be those expected to result in a loss.
Subject to the uncertainties of the Court Holding Company1 6 and
Cumberland Public Service 7 cases, another method of achieving the rec-
ognition of losses without the recognition of gains in some cases is simply
to have the corporation sell the loss assets and then distribute the assets
which are expected to result in gain pro rata to the shareholders, taking
care that the requirements of section 337 are not met. Under the rules
previously discussed, 8 if the transaction is properly handled, the corpora-
tion will realize a loss but will realize no gain from the distribution of
its assets in liquidation and the shareholders selling the assets after liqui-
dation will realize only a nominal gain or loss because in their hands the
assets take a new basis equal to their fair market value.1"
DESIRABILITY OF FILING FORM 966 UPON ADOPTION OF PLAN
Section 6043 of the Internal Revenue Code requires a corporation
adopting a plan of liquidation or dissolution to inform the Internal Reve-
nue Service of the fact within thirty days after it has been adopted. The
Treasury Department has prescribed Form 966 for this purpose. Noth-
ing in either section 337 and its regulations, or section 6043 and its regu-
lations refers to the other section, yet administrative problems give the
Internal Revenue Service considerable incentive to urge that Form 966
must be filed in order for section 337 to apply. The Treasury, of course,
is aware that in many cases corporate minutes purporting to reflect action
on a particular day are prepared long after the date involved and without
any meeting actually having taken place."0 From the Treasury's stand-
point it is certainly desirable to have some check on the validity of min-
utes which purport to reflect the adoption of a plan of liquidation. Form
966 does offer at least some hope of an administrative remedy.
Unfortunately there are no effective sanctions for failing to file this
15. See, e.g., OrIO REV. CODE § 1701.76.
16. Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1954).
17. United States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
18. See Dye, General Rules Re Liquidations, p. 238 supra.
19. CODE § 334(a).
20. See the first decision of the Fourth Circuit in Shull v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 447 (4th
Cir. 1959).
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form on time. The answer of the Service may well be to attempt to es-
tablish a new sanction by urging that the timely filing of Form 966 is a
condition precedent to the operation of section 337. In fact, there is a
case pending in the Tax Court which is reported to involve, among other
things, exactly this contention by the Government.2 Furthermore, a re-
cent Tax Court Memorandum Decision22 gave considerable weight to its
finding that no Form 966 had been filed. On the other hand, in two
recently decided cases2" the Tax Court made no mention of the fact that
the form was not filed on time. Certainly the chances are not great that
the courts will accept the proposition that Form 966 must be filed to ob-
tain the benefits of section 337. Nevertheless, prudence dictates the
timely filing of Form 966 when the benefits of section 337 are desired. 4
SALE OR EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY
Under the statute only the sale or exchange of property within the
twelve-month period following the adoption of the plan is entitled to non-
recognition of gain or loss. For the most part the concept of sale or ex-
change has been adequately defined under the tax law for other purposes,
and in any event any discussion of the transactions which will be con-
sidered to be a sale or exchange is far beyond the limitations of this
article.2" Nevertheless, a few special circumstances deserve mention.
Sale or Exchange Treated as a Reorganization
The most recently established danger in section 337 liquidations is a
sale of assets of the liquidating corporation to another corporation which
has stockholders in common with the liquidating corporation. In Au-
gust 1961, the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 61-156,28
which held that a liquidating corporation was not entitled to the benefits
of section 337 where a substantial part of its assets had been sold to an-
other corporation in which stockholders of the liquidating corporation
had a forty-five per cent stock interest. The result, however, was not a
tax on the gain from the sale of assets, but the treatment of the entire
21. Plaza Liquor, Inc., Tax Court Docket No. 88680. In addition, it has been reported that
revenue agents have been instructed to force taxpayers to litigate section 337 cases where Form
966 was not filed. P-H Tax Ideas, Oct. 3, 1961, p. 6.
22. Intercounty Dev. Corp., P-H 1961 TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. (30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem.)
5 61217 (July 31, 1961).
23. Mountain Water Co. of LaCrescenta, 35 T.C. No. 5 (Dec. 13, 1960); Powells Pontiac-
Cadillac, Inc. v. Gross, U.S. Tax Cas. 75,817 (D. N. J. 1960).
24. Care should be taken in the preparation of this form since it is likely that statements in
it will, as a practical matter, be binding on the taxpayer. See Shull v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d
447 (4th Cit. 1959).
25. See Hacker, Elements of Capital Gain - General: What Is a "Sale or Exchange"?, 12
WEST. REs. L. REv. 253 (1961).
26. 1961 INT. REV. BULL. No. 34, at 10.
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transaction as a reorganization" which, in most cases, would have a far
more drastic tax consequence than merely taxing the gain on the sale of
assets in the course of liquidation.28 Taxpayers had, in effect, been fore-
warned of this ruling by the Commissioner's previous announcement that
he would not issue rulings on the applicability of either section 337 or
section 33129 where assets of the liquidating corporation were sold to an-
other corporation in which the stockholders of the liquidating corporation
had more than a nominal interest in the purchasing corporation. Actual-
ly, Revenue Ruling 61-156 does not go so far as to say that the reorgani-
zation treatment will be applied whenever the liquidating corporation
shareholders have more than such a nominal interest. The ruling does
indicate, however, that this treatment will be applied if the shareholders
of the liquidating corporation have a "definite and substantial equity in-
terest" in the purchasing corporation. This is the same language used in
applying the so-called "continuity of interest" requirement for corporate
reorganizations." In applying this doctrine the courts have held that as
little as twenty-five per cent of the value of the total number of shares
transferred in a reorganization represented a substantial continuing in-
terest.8" The Commissioner, however, on the authority of the Reilly Oil
case, has consistently maintained that the continuity-of-interest doctrine
was not satisfied unless at least fifty per cent of the stock interest prior
to reorganization continued to be represented by stock after the reorgani-
zation. The conclusion seems to be that to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue the meaning of the word "substantial" and perhaps the entire
continuity-of-interest doctrine depends upon where the chips fall.88
The extent to which the courts will uphold the Commissioner's new
position34 remains to be seen. It seems unlikely that the courts will sus-
tain the position that a reorganization occurs where the continuing stock
interest is on the order of ten per cent or twenty per cent when the literal
terms of the reorganization provisions have not been met. Informed
27. The propriety of this treatment is open to question, but is beyond the scope of this article.
28. The ruling treated assets withdrawn as dividends or "boot." No gain or loss was recog-
nized on the sale and basis of the assets "sold" remained the same.
29. T.I.R. 310, 7 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAx REP. 5 6325 (March 3, 1961), amending
Rev. Proc. 60-6, 1960-1 Culm. BULL. 880.
30. John A. Nelson Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 374 (1936); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea
Co., 296 U.S. 378 (1936).
31. Miller v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 415 (6th Cir. 1936).
32. Reilly Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1951). Note that the Com-
missioner has maintained the fifty per cent continuing interest requirement in issuing informal
(unpublished) rulings despite Supreme Court authority to the contrary. See Helvering v.
Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (1936).
33. It is possible that the Commissioner has modified his views on whether the continuity-of-
interest doctrine requires a fifty per cent continuing stock ownership.
34. Revenue Ruling 61-156 revoked Revenue Ruling 56-541, 1956-2 CUm. BULL. 189,
which reached a contrary result under similar drcumstances. Because the ruling represents a
change of position by the Commissioner it will not be applied retroactively.
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opinion seems to be that the best the Commissioner can hope for in court
is a fifty per cent dividing line. However, Revenue Ruling 61-156 dear-
ly indicates that the Commissioner is ready to do battle where the per-
centage is lower. Until the situation is clarified, the client's interest is
best served by avoiding sales to related corporations and thus avoiding
litigation.
Sales to subsidiaries, whether existing or newly created, should be
viewed in the same light where the liquidation plan contemplates distri-
bution of the subsidiary stock in kind. While the published rulings have
not dealt with this situation, it is obvious that the effect of a sale to a
subsidiary is the same as, if not worse than, a sale to a related corporation
where the subsidiary's stock is to be distributed in kind. 5
Involuntary Conversion Treated as a Sale or Exchange
A controversy has arisen on the question whether a casualty loss and
the subsequent receipt of insurance proceeds constitutes a sale or exchange
under section 337. Both the Court of Claims36 and the Fourth Circuit T
have held that it does. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, however,
has ruled to the contrary8 and the Tax Court has agreed, 9 although it
was later reversed by the Fourth Circuit. The theory of the Fourth Cir-
cuit and the Court of Claims is that under section 1231 of the Internal
Revenue Code, casualty losses are, in effect, treated as sales or exchanges,
and that Congress must have intended that the statutory rules of sale or
exchange would apply under section 337. The Commissioner in his rul-
ing, however, points out that section 1231 does not actually treat casualty
losses as sales or exchanges, but merely provides that the tax should be
computed at capital gains rates and then only if there is a gain rather than
a loss. While the position of the Commissioner certainly is the more logi-
cal application of the literal terms of section 337, the equities of the situ-
ation seem to favor the Court of Claims and the Fourth Circuit.
40
The decisions have not yet involved the application of section 337 to
a case where the casualty caused the decision to liquidate and the plan of
liquidation was not adopted until after the casualty had occurred. 4' How-
35. In special situations the Tax Court has considered liquidations complete despite the trans-
fer of assets to newly organized subsidiaries. Morley Cypress Trust, 3 T.C. 84 (1944), acq.,
1944 CuM. BULL. 20; J. S. Alexander, 2 T.C. 917 (1943), acq., 1943 CuM. BULL. 1.
36. Tonawanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. CI. 1960).
37. Kent Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961).
38. Rev. Rul. 56-372, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 187.
39. Kent Mfg. Corp., 33 T.C. 930 (1960), revd., 288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961).
40. The Fourth Circuit, in Kent Manufacturing Corporation v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 812,
815 (4th Cir. 1961), gives an example of the inequitable results which could occur if a casualty
were held not to be a sale or exchange.
41. In Kent Manufacturing Corporation, 33 T.C. 930, rev'd, 288 F.2d 812 (4th Cir. 1961),
the casualty and the realization of gain occurred before the adoption of any plan, but the case
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ever, they do afford an opportunity for non-recognition where the adop-
tion of the plan follows the casualty. Where such a casualty results in
income, the income will be considered to have been earned, by and large,
at the time of the settlement with the insurance company. If the
casualty and subsequent receipt of insurance proceeds are to be treated as a
sale or exchange, it would seem logical to hold that the sale or exchange
likewise takes place at the time of the settlement with the insurance com-
pany, allowing time to adopt a plan of liquidation prior to the "sale."
The Commissioner has ruled that a condemnation is a sale or ex-
change for purposes of section 337,4s and this seems correct. The prob-
lem, if any problems arise from a condemnation, is likely to come from
the timing requirements rather than the question of whether a sale or
exchange has occurred. The sale will probably be held to have taken
place at the time tide vests in the governmental authority whereas the
proceeds often will not be received within twelve months, particularly if
there is a dispute as to the value. If there are numerous stockholders, it
may be quite difficult to complete the liquidation within twelve months in
this situation.44
Liquidation of a Less Than Eighty Per Cent Subsidiary
Treated as a Sale or Exchange
The Commissioner has ruled that liquidation of a less than eighty per
cent subsidiary constitutes a sale or exchange.45 This ruling also held that
such a subsidiary itself can adopt a plan of liquidation and sell assets free
from recognition of gain or loss. Accordingly, a number of alternatives
are available to handle a less than eighty per cent subsidiary: (1) the sub-
sidiary can be liquidated under section 337; (2) the subsidiary can be
liquidated with the assets distributed in kind and without the recognition
of gain or loss to the parent if the parent has adopted its own plan;
(3) the subsidiary stock can be sold without recognition of gain or loss
if the parent has adopted a plan; (4) the subsidiary stock can be dis-
tributed in kind to the parent's stockholders. If the liquidating parent
owns eighty per cent or more of the subsidiary's stock46 the subsidiary can-
was governed by section 392, an interim application of section 337, which did not require a
plan to be adopted before a sale.
42. See Cambria Clay Prods. Co., 5 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 198 (1936); Raleigh County Bank,
11 P-H B.T.A. Mem. 1094 (1942). This result is also implied by the Regulations under
sections 165 and 1033 of the Code.
43. Rev. Rul. 59-108, 1959-1 CuM. BULL. 72.
44. See p. 260 infra, for methods of handling this situation.
45. Rev. Ru. 57-243, 1957-1 CUm. BULL. 72.
46. Technically a controlled subsidiary for this purpose is one in which the parent owns stock
possessing at least eighty per cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock
entitled to vote and at least eighty per cent of the total number of shares of all other classes of
stock, except non-voting preferred stock. See CoDE § 332(b) (1).
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not effectively sell its assets without recognition of gain under section 337.
Absent application of the step transaction doctrine, the parent could re-
duce its shareholdings so that the subsidiary could qualify for section 337
treatment. The liquidation of a controlled subsidiary by distribution of
its assets in kind is possible with the consequences discussed in a subse-
quent article.47 Further, where such a controlled subsidiary is involved,
the minority shareholders can, in effect, be granted section 337 treatment,
but the opportunities for this are somewhat limited.
Statutory Sales or Exchanges
There are a number of statutory provisions providing that specific
transactions shall or shall not be granted treatment as sales or exchanges.48
For the most part the Commissioner's attitude on the applicability of these
provisions in a section 337 liquidation is revealed by two rulings, Revenue
Ruling 57-140"° relating to liquidations and Revenue Ruling 56-37250
relating to casualty losses. Revenue Ruling 57-140 states that liquida-
tions are sales or exchanges for purposes of section 337 because section
331 provides, without limitation, that assets distributed in complete liqui-
dation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock. Reve-
nue Ruling 56-372, on the other hand, states that a casualty is not to be
considered a sale or exchange for the purpose of applying section 337 be-
cause section 1231 provides merely that the tax in certain circumstances
should be computed at capital gains rates and does not say that the loss
and subsequent receipt of insurance proceeds is a sale or exchange. Based
on this reasoning, most of the statutory sale or exchange provisions should
apply to section 337 as well as for other tax purposes since, for the most
part, they say without limitation that the transaction shall be treated as a
sale or exchange.
Section 631, which gives capital gain treatment to the proceeds from
timber and coal leases, is a possible exception. If a coal lease, for instance,
were to be treated as a sale or exchange, it would be possible for a corpo-
ration in the coal business to lease its coal during the liquidation period
and then distribute the lease in liquidation. Under a literal interpretation
47. See Dye, Tax-Free Liquidation of a Subsidiary, p. 273 infra.
48. Examples of special treatment are: Section 1238 of the Code, treating gain attributable
to excess emergency amortization as ordinary income (held subject to non-recognition under
section 337 by Rev. Rul. 59-308, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 110); Section 165(g) treating a loss
from the worthlessness of a security as a loss from sale or exchange; Section 1234 treating a
loss from the failure to exercise an option as a loss from a sale or exchange; Section 1232
treating amounts received on retirement of a bond as being in exchange for the bond; Section
1241 treating amounts received for cancellation of a lease or distributorship as in exchange
for the lease or distributorship; Section 631 (See pp. 254-55 supra); Section 331 (a) treating
liquidations as exchanges (See Dye, General Rules Re Liquidations, pp. 238-39 supra.);
Regulation section 1.166-6 treating mortgage foreclosures as an exchange; Section 166(d)
of the Code dealing with bad debts.
49. 1957-1 CuM. BULL. 116.
50. 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 187.
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of the statute, the result would be that no income would be recognized to
anyone on the coal royalties. The Commissioner and the courts are likely
to strain to avoid such a result and a statutory distinction is possible. In
contrast with most of the other statutory sale or exchange provisions, sec-
tion 631 does not say that the coal or timber lease shall be treated as a
sale or exchange, but says instead that the income element "shall be con-
sidered as though it were" a gain on the sale of coal or timber.
PROPERTY WHICH MAY NOT BE SOLD OR EXCHANGED
Income Items Excluded From Definition of Property
A number of attempts to convert ordinary income into capital gain
in a liquidation situation, discussed elsewhere,"1 have no special signifi-
cance in the application of section 337. However, section 337 does create
new opportunities in this area. The statutory scheme is non-recognition
of all gain on the sale of property within the twelve-month period. It
is not limited to non-recognition of capital gain items." Taxpayers
naturally have tried to exploit this by "selling" items which would result
in ordinary income if held to fruition. Generally the government has
been successful in preventing this distortion of the purpose of section 337.
For instance, a case and a ruling have held that the interest element in
the sale of a discount obligation or an obligation with accrued interest
which is not yet due, will result in ordinary income.5" Similarly, the
sale of accounts receivable from which a bad debt reserve has been
previously deducted, has been held to give rise to ordinary income to the
extent of the reserve.5"
A chink in the government's armor, however, was opened by the
51. See Calkins etal., Tax Problems of a Close Corporation: A Survey, 10 Wss. REs. L Rnv. 9,
113 (1959).
52. Rev. Rul. 59-308, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 110.
53. Central Bldg. & Loan Associates, 34 T.C. No. 3 (June 7, 1960); Rev. Rul. 59-120,
1959-1 CuM BULL. 74. The theory is that the interest is collected and therefore that the
"sale" of the right to receive it is in effect an assignment of income.
54. Rev. RUl. 57-482, 1957-2 Cum. BULL 49; Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Ira Handelman, 36 T.C. No. 57 (June 26, 1961);
West Seattle Natel Bank, 33 T.C. 341 (1959), aff'd., 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961). While the
Handelman case implied that this result would be reached only in a case where there was no
loss on the sale of the receivables, the Citizens case required the unnecessary reserve to be
included in income without reference to the gain or loss on the sale of the receivables. There
is some chance that it will be held that there is no income when the receivables are sold for
their face amount less the bad debt reserve, on the theory (rejected in the Citizens case) that
the reserve for bad debts is a contravaluation account analogous to a depreciation reserve.
The contrary theory is that the bad debt reserve is not a contravaluation account but a deduc-
tion for future expected losses, which must be restored to income when it becomes evident
that there will be no losses because of the sale of the receivables. Under this theory any loss
on the sale of receivables as a whole (in most cases the face amount less the sales price)
would not be recognized under section 337, nor could it be charged against the reserve because
it would not represent a loss on any specific debt.
The Commissioner has recently extended the theory of Revenue Ruling 57-482 consider-
ably in Revenue Ruling 61-214, 1961 INT. REV. BULL. NO. 50 at 7. This Ruling holds that
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Kuckenberg case,5" where the Tax Court held that the sale of partially
completed construction contracts was entitled to the benefit of the non-
recognition provided by section 337. Unfortunately for taxpayers, little
reliance can be placed on this decision. Not only is the Commissioner
still contesting this case,5" but the Tax Court has, in effect, announced
that it already has second thoughts about its holding. The statute pro-
vides non-recognition only on sales of property, and certain installment
obligations are specifically excluded from the definition of property.
Thus in Family Record Plan, Inc.,57 the Tax Court held that the sale of
ordinary accounts receivable, even though not treated as installment obli-
gations under section 453, were installment obligations within the
meaning of section 337. Accordingly, the Tax Court held that the
gain on the sale of the obligations was ordinary income. The Tax
Court considered its own holding in the Kuckenberg case, but held that
it was not controlling on the ground that that case had not considered
whether the construction contracts represented installment obligations.
While the Family Record Plan case casts considerable doubt on the
continued validity of the Kuckenberg case, it is far from inevitable that
the Tax Court would reach a different result if the Kuckenberg case were
presented to it again. Aside from the fact that a ruling that partially
completed construction contracts are "installment obligations" would
stretch the ordinary meaning of the words completely out of joint, the
only installment obligations which are excluded from the statutory defini-
tion of property are those acquired in respect of the sale or exchange of
property. While the partially completed construction contract itself may
be regarded as property, it is difficult to see how a court could hold that it
was acquired in respect of the sale or exchange of other property. Obvi-
ously this is an area in which the law is developing and final answers are
difficult to predict. It should be noted that no circuit court has yet
ruled even on the Tax Court's somewhat novel decision that "installment
obligations" as used in section 337 means something other than statutory
installment obligations under section 453 of the Code.
Inventory Excluded From Definition of Property - Exception
Except in regard to the unresolved issue as to the meaning of "install-
ment obligations" as used in section 337, the statutory definition of prop-
when the assets of a corporation liquidating under section 337 include supplies, the cost of
which has previously been deducted, the sale price is included in income in the year of the
sale regardless of section 337. The theory is that this is more like the recovery of an amount
previously deducted than a gain from the sale of assets. In spite of the considerable equities
favoring the Commissioner's position there is no statutory authority for this treatment and
it is quite doubtful that the courts will be so zealous in protecting the revenue.
55. Henry A. Kuckenberg, 35 T.C. No. 55 (Dec. 30, 1960).
56. Appeal docketed, 9th Cir., June 2, 1961.
57. 36 T.C. No. 21 (May 19, 1961), appeal docketed, 9th Cir., Sept 1961.
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erty is fairly straightforward. In substance, inventory, installment obliga-
tions acquired with respect to inventory, and installment obligations ac-
quired in respect to other property sold before adoption of the plan
of liquidation are excluded from the definition of property. There is an
exception to the exclusion, however, for inventory (or installment obliga-
tions acquired in respect to inventory) where substantially all the inven-
tory attributable to a trade or business is sold to one person in one trans-
action. This means that if the liquidating corporation operates more than
one business, substantially all the inventory of any one business may be
sold to one person in one transaction without the recognition of gain.
The regulations58 make some attempt at defining what is a separate busi-
ness for this purpose, but this treatment is not nearly so extensive as it is
under section 355, so that resort to the regulations under section 355 may
be helpful in dose cases.59
The regulations state that the inventory that must be sold to one
person in one transaction to achieve non-recognition is substantially all
the inventory existing at the time of the sale. While this is a logical
application of the statutory scheme," interpreted literally, it creates the
opportunity for selling inventory that is expected to result in a loss piece-
meal, and then when only the inventory which is expected to result in a
gain is left, selling that in one transaction to one person. Again, taxpay-
ers attempting to distort the purpose of section 337 in this manner may
expect strong opposition from the Revenue Service, probably on the
ground that the sale of the loss inventory was part of a plan for the sale
of substantially all the inventory, and viewing the sale as a whole, sub-
stantially all the inventory was not sold to one person in one transaction.
Of course, if a taxpayer expects to have an overall loss on the disposition
of the inventory, it should have no difficulty in achieving recognition of
the loss simply by selling all its inventory to a number of different people.
In this situation it would be reasonable to sell the inventory that will
result in the greatest loss first in order to minimize the consequences of
a contention that any loss on the last inventory sold should not be recog-
nized because it represented a sale of substantially all the inventory at that
time.
58. Reg. §§ 1.337-2(c), (d) (1955).
59. Reg. § 1.355-1(d) (1955).
60. If it -were required that substantially all the inventory existing at the time of the adop-
tion of the plan be sold in bulk, corporations attempting to reduce inventory prior to a bulk
sale would be unduly hampered. The only practical interpretation of the statute is the one
adopted by the Regulations, namely that the liquidating corporation can use its inventory in
its ordinary business with ordinary income consequences, prior to a bulk sale. The Regulations
also require that inventory sold in bulk not be replaced. Reg. § 1.337-3(b) (1955).
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COMPLETE LIQUIDATION WITHIN TWELVE MONTHS
Retention of Assets to Meet Certain Claims
The statute requires that the corporation be completely liquidated
within the twelve-month period beginning on the date of the adoption
of the plan, except that assets may be retained to meet claims. Although
there has recently been some indication of leniency, it is likely that this
requirement will be strictly construed. The regulations, in fact, state
that no extension of the twelve-month period can be granted.6 The re-
cent case of Mountain Water Company of LaCrescenta,62 in which the
Commissioner has acquiesced,' has applied a de minimis rule to section
337 liquidations, but it is of such limited scope that it cannot be relied
on, at least for planning purposes. In that case only about 1/10th of
one per cent of the assets of the corporation remained on the day the
twelve-month period expired and even these assets were primarily funds
to meet checks already mailed to stockholders. Furthermore, the court
placed strong emphasis on the corporation's good faith in the matter
and honest attempts to liquidate promptly. Accordingly, if a corporation
plans to retain assets, relying on the de minimis rule of the Mountain
Water case, it is likely that it will not have met the good faith require-
ment and the rule will not apply.
Both the statute and regulations allow the retention of assets to meet
claims."4 The Regulations emphasize that in the case of unascertained
or contingent liabilities or expenses the arrangement must be made in
good faith and the amount must be reasonable.65 Obviously this language
leaves a large area of uncertainty. In the case of a closely held corpora-
tion the problem should not be too serious, for with a small number of
shareholders it is relatively easy to distribute assets subject to all out-
standing claims. In a large corporation, however, this course of action
will probably be impractical and furthermore may lead to personal lia-
bility on the part of the directors authorizing distributions without having
made adequate provisions for claims. There has been little elucidation
of principles in this area, so that the taxpayer is left to his own devices.
Furthermore, the question of what is "reasonable" in this situation is one
of fact upon which an advance ruling probably could not be obtained.
It would seem logical to rely on past experience if there were a large
61. Reg. § 1.337-1 (1955).
62. 35 T.C. No. 50 (Dec. 13, 1960).
63. 1961-1 CUM. BULL. 4.
64. CoDE § 337(a); Reg. § 1.337-1 (1955); Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (1955). According to
the Regulations no assets may be retained to meet claims of stockholders.
65. Regulation section 1.337-1 provides that assets retained to meet claims must be specifically
set aside for the purpose and must be reasonable in relation to the items involved. This suggests
that the best procedure is to set up a specific "claims fund," identifying all known claims and
adding a category of "unascertained claims."
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number of contingent claims of the same sort as had been faced through
the life of the corporation. On the other hand, if there are relatively few
claims with no past experience as a guide, the problem may be so difficult
that a liquidation under section 337 should not be attempted. If there
is only one claim and the damages are definite in amount, but the liability
is uncertain, the corporation should be allowed to retain sufficient assets
to pay the claim in full if necessary. In this situation the retention of
anything less than the full amount of the claim is no practical protection
*o the directors.
There has been one interesting, although not very authoritative, inter-
pretation of what assets may be retained to meet claims. In In re Turn-
pike Theatre Corporation,66 the Superior Court of Hartford County,
Connecticut, held that where the applicability of section 337 was uncer-
tain, it was proper to retain sufficient assets to pay the tax on the sale
of corporate assets, if it were imposed. This case seems correct and indi-
cates that where the problem is a single claim, assets may be retained to
meet the claim in full, even though it is more likely than not that the
corporation can defeat the daim.
Retention of Assets to Meet Claims of Vendee of the Business
Section 337 will often be used in connection with a sale of a sub-
stantial part or all of the business assets of the company. Contracts for
such sale of assets are normally involved, and if drawn without specific
reference to section 337 may lead to difficult problems in meeting the
requirement that the corporation be liquidated within twelve months. For
instance, such contracts very often contain warranties and representations
which may give rise to a claimed liability. In order to minimize the dif-
ficulty of the question of the amount of assets that may be retained to
meet such a claim, it would seem to be advisable to provide in the contract
of sale that any daim for liability in connection with the sale contract
must be asserted prior to the expiration of the twelve-month period. This
at least will give the directors a dear basis for retaining some assets.
Another common feature of such sales contracts is a provision that part
of the sale price is to be paid only after a period or only after a condition
has been fulfilled. For instance, payments for accounts receivable may
be made as the accounts are collected. Similarly, a sum may be placed in
escrow pending title clearance of real estate. This sort of provision should
be avoided if at all possible in a sales contract where the use of section 337
is contemplated. If the contract contains such a provision and there is
66. Reported in Tax Barometer, Aug. 19, 1961 5 1302. State courts may decide certain
federal tax questions which will bind the government if the government chooses to appear
in a state proceeding. The present case arose in a receivership proceeding where the claims
had to be adjudicated in order to determine the proper distribution of assets.
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a dispute arising from the sale, the seller will often be placed in an im-
possible negotiating position both because of the requirement of liquida-
tion within twelve months and because of the impractibility in many
cases of distributing a contingent claim of this sort in liquidation. Dis-
senting shareholders may enjoy a similar favorable negotiating position
unless very prompt action is taken to meet the dissenters' claims."
Use of Trustee to Complete Liquidation
If, in spite of precautions, the corporation is left with assets which,
as a practical matter, cannot be distributed as the twelve-month period
draws to a close, some remedial action is possible. The regulations"8 pro-
vide that a distribution in liquidation includes a transfer to a state official,
trustee, or other authorized person, if the Commissioner is satisfied that
the shareholders who are entitled to the distribution cannot be located. By
implication this would seem to preclude the use of liquidating trustees
except in the case of missing shareholders. It is understood, however,
that the Commissioner has taken the position in issuing informal rulings
that liquidating trustees can be used without forfeiting the benefits of
section 337 in three limited circumstances. The first is where the liquidat-
ing trustees are appointed by all the shareholders and not by the corpora-
tion.6" The second is where a local court has appointed the trustees on
behalf of the shareholders, and the third is where a court has refused to
take jurisdiction and the liquidating trustees are appointed under the ap-
plicable state law, which ordinarily would require less than a unanimous
vote. In any event the liquidating trust must not be a trust which would
be taxable as a corporation. These informal requirements differ from the
normal rules for liquidating trustees and do not seem to have any particu
lar relevancy in carrying out the basic purpose of the statute.
Use of Escheat Laws to Complete Liquidation
Similar problems arise when one or more stockholders cannot be lo-
cated. It has been noted that the Regulations give some relief in this area
and, in addition, it is understood that the second and third of the three
methods mentioned above for appointing a liquidating trustee will be
acceptable for handling missing stockholders as well as assets which can-
not practically be distributed. Another possibility that should be in-
67. As noted, the Regulations do not permit the retention of assets to meet claims of stock-
holders. Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (1955). Query, whether a dissenter who has perfected his
rights is a stockholder for this purpose?
68. Reg. § 1.1337-2(b) (1955).
69. Legislation has been proposed to allow the appointment of such trustees by less than all
shareholders. Subchapter C Advisory Group Proposed Amendments, as Revised December 11,
1958, Section 15.
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vestigated in case of missing stockholders is the applicability of escheat
laws. Several states have escheat statutes which would make it possible,
and perhaps unavoidable, to pay the liquidating distribution of the miss-
ing stockholder to a state official.70 While the escheat laws are usually
considered something to be avoided, in this situation they may be very
helpful in saving a section 337 liquidation. Normally these laws provide
that the stockholder can assert his rights against the state for a consider-
able period of time.
"Complete Liquidation" as Strictly Construed
The term "complete liquidation" is not defined either in the statute or
Regulations. The Regulations under section 331, however, do shed some
light on the meaning of the term. They state that a liquidation which
is preceded by or followed by a transfer of "all or part" of the assets of
the corporation to another corporation (presumably commonly owned to
some extent) may have the effect of a distribution of a dividend. 1 The
phrase "all or part" has been interpreted in another context as including
"any part" even though it is an extremely small percentage of the total
assets involved.7" It seems likely that the use of the words "all or part"
in these Regulations was not accidental and that therefore the Commis-
sioner intends a very strict interpretation of "complete liquidation."
While the Regulations speak in terms of a transfer to another corporation,
obviously the retention of assets by the liquidating corporation would
have the same effect. Therefore, in the absence of reasonable grounds for
retaining assets to meet claims, it would seem that the retention of vir-
tually anything by the liquidating corporation beyond a twelve-month
period would disqualify the plan? This conclusion should stand in spite
of the de minimis rule established by the Mountain Water case," which is
so limited that as a practical matter, it means nothing.
Advisability of Dissolution After Liquidation
It is dear that liquidation and dissolution are independent of each
other and that the corporation need not be dissolved in order to be com-
pletely liquidated." Furthermore, it is understood that the Commissioner
has issued informal rulings to the effect that the retention of the cor-
70. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 11-44 (1940).
71. Reg. § 1.331-1(c) (1955).
72. Commissioner v. Food Indus. Inc., 101 F.2d 748 (3d Cit. 1939); Commissioner v.
Whitaker, 101 F2d 640 (1st Cir. 1938); Helvering v. Schoellkopf, 100 F.2d 415 (2d Cir.
1938); Commissioner v. Kolb, 100 F.2d 920 (9th Cir. 1938).
73. Regulation section 1.337-2(b) (1955) requires distribution of all assets (other than
those retained to meet claims) within the twelve-month period.
74. Mountain Water Co. of LaCrescenta, 35 T.C. No. 50 (Dec. 13, 1960).
75. Reg. § 1.332-2(c) (1955) states this in another context.
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porate charter for name holding purposes will not affect the completeness
of a liquidation for section 337 purposes. 6 Nevertheless, it would seem
to be the better practice to proceed with dissolution fairly promptly. The
Commissioner has ruled that if the corporate charter is used subsequently,
at least if within a fairly short period of time, the liquidation will not be
considered complete and the benefits of section 337 will be lost." Disso-
lution will prevent the possibility of an accidental use of the corporate
charter with unforeseen tax consequences.
As a matter of good practice, all the formalities should be complied
with in the course of the liquidation. While a general bill of sale may
be legally sufficient to transfer all rights to the assets to the stockholders,
controversy will be avoided by going through the further formalities
which would be used in an arm's length sale. For instance, real property
should be formally deeded and deeds recorded, automotive vehicles should
be retitled, and bank accounts should be dosed out and the stockholders
should open new accounts.
UNAVAILABILITY OF SECTION 337
There are a number of situations in which section 337 will not apply.
While for the most part the use of section 337 is precluded only in limited
areas, in the aggregate the exceptions leave a substantial number of cases
where non-recognition of gain on the sale of assets cannot be achieved.
Perhaps the most unfair instance of non-application of section 337 is
in the case of an insolvent corporation, the very case where its benefits
are most needed. The Commissioner has ruled both for the purposes of
section 337,7" and for other liquidation provisions" that a distribution
to creditors as payment on a debt is not a distribution in liquidation be-
cause it is not made to stockholders. While this is perfectly logical and
compatible with the statute, a good case can be made that the equities of
the situation require legislative correction.
Non-Applicability of Section 337 to a Collapsible
Corporation - Exception
Section 337 will also not apply where the other special statutory
liquidation provisions do apply. Thus it does not apply to a one-month
liquidation, nor to a collapsible corporation."0 However, it should be
noted that section 341, dealing with collapsible corporations, does contain
76. This position is of doubtful validity and may not be adhered to if the name is a valuable
asset.
77. Rev. Rul. 60-50, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 150.
78. Rev. Rul. 56-387, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 189.
79. Northern Coal & Dock Co., 12 T.C. 42 (1949), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 3.
80. CODE § 337(c).
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a special exception which provides that under special circumstances a
corporation shall not be considered collapsible for the purpose of section
337.81 While this exception is complicated, in essence, it provides that
if the unrealized appreciation in ordinary income assets does not exceed
fifteen per cent of the net worth of the corporation, if substantially all
the properties of the corporation are sold by it within the twelve-month
date, and if there is no distribution of depreciable property, the corpora-
tion will be entitled to the benefits of section 337, even though it is con-
sidered to be collapsible for other purposes.
Aside from the above mentioned exception, the interaction of the col-
lapsible corporation provisions and section 337 is interesting. The Com-
missioner has ruled that when a collapsible corporation attempts a liqui-
dation under section 337, section 337 does not apply.82 This means that
the corporation realizes gain on the sale of its assets. However, since the
corporation has realized the gain on the sale of its assets, the corporation
is no longer collapsible. Therefore, the shareholders will realize capital
gain on the liquidation rather than ordinary income under the collapsible
corporation rules. In effect this means that in most cases the maximum
over-all tax burden on the liquidation would be about forty-four per
cent.93
Non-Applicability of Section 337 to an Eighty Per Cent
Subsidiary - Exceptions
It has been noted that as a practical matter, the benefits of section 337
are not available to an eighty per cent subsidiary. Actually, this is not
completely true. If the parent has owned the subsidiary's stock for a
period of two years or more, section 337 can never be used."' However,
if the stock of the subsidiary has been purchased within two years of the
liquidation and the basis of property distributed to the parent is deter-
mined under section 334(b) (2)," then the statute provides, in effect,
that the subsidiary may use as a basis for its assets, the amount the parent
paid for the stock, allocated in accordance with the Regulations. "
Where such a controlled subsidiary is involved, substantially complete
non-recognition benefits are allowed to the minority shareholders. Since
81. CODE § 341(e) (4). This exception does not apply to sales of depredable property
to a stockholder who with his close relatives owns twenty per cent of the corporation's stock.
82. Rev. Rul. 58-241, 1958-1 Cum. Bul. 179.
83. Assuming a zero basis for both assets and stock there would be a twenty-five per cent tax
on the sale of assets by the corporation and a further tax of twenty-five per cent on the re-
maining seventy-five per cent (18.75 per cent of the whole). Of course sales of inventory
or stock in trade could be taxed at a higher rate.
84. CODE § 337 (c) (2) (A).
85. See Dye, Tax Free Liquidation of a Subsidiary, p. 275 infra.
86. CODE § 337(c) (2) (B).
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this relief is allowed only to the minority shareholders, it is accomplished
by a calculation of the amount of tax which would have been saved if
section 337 were applicable. The minority shareholder reports as the
proceeds of liquidation the amount he actually received on the liquidation
increased by his share of this tax. He is credited with this amount as if
it had been a tax payment in his behalf." Of course, all the other rules
of the statute must be complied with in order to gain the benefits of this
ruling so that the parent corporation will be able to grant or deny these
benefits to the minority shareholders at will, at least in the absence of
the development of some corporate law to the effect that the corporation
or the directors have an obligation to reduce the taxes of minority share-
holders.
Applicability of Section 337 to Special Statutory Corporations
Section 337 should apply to the special statutory types of corporations.
The Commissioner has ruled that it will apply to an association taxable
as a corporation.8" A partnership electing to be taxed as a corporation
under section 1361 should be able to use section 337 since the statute pro-
vides that all of Subchapter "C" is applicable.8" The Regulations, how-
ever, in discussing liquidation do not say whether section 337 will apply."
It should be noted that in contrast to all other types of liquidations, the
liquidation of a partnership which is taxable as a corporation requires the
adoption of a written plan of liquidation."
There is nothing in the statute or Regulations which would prevent
the application of section 337 to a so-called Subchapter "S" corporation.
However, there would seem to be little advantage in using it for a Sub-
chapter "S" corporation because Subchapter "S" itself will eliminate the
double tax whether on liquidation or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
The development of the law since the enactment of section 337 in
1954 has not impaired the availability of the needed relief from double
taxation which Congress intended. However, some of the technical de-
cisions have made it a good deal more difficult to secure this relief than
was generally assumed in 1954. The lesson to be learned is that section
337 must not be used casually but must be treated with respect.
87. CODE 5 337(d).
88. Rev. Rul. 58-391, 1958-2 Cutm. BULL. 139.
89. CODE § 1361(1) : "A distribution in partial or complete liquidation with respect to a
partnership interest by an enterprise as to which an election has been made under subsection
(a), shall be treated as a corporate liquidation in accordance with part II of Subchapter C
of this chapter."
90. See Reg. § 1.1361-5(b) (1960)
91. Reg. § 1.1361-11(b) (1960).
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